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Abstract
Equity compensation is widely used for incentivizing skilled employees, particularly in new
technology businesses. Traditional theories explaining why firms o↵er equity suggest that work-
ers with higher rank should receive compensation packages more heavily weighted in equity.
However, we observe the puzzle that many firms adopt an equality-in-equity strategy: they o↵er
di↵erent cash salaries across all jobs but the same equity compensation. We propose a behav-
ioral theory of domain-contingent inequality aversion to explain this finding: we argue that
workers view salary and equity as two domains and are more inequality averse in the equity
domain. Inequality in equity has a negative asymmetric e↵ect on e↵ort whereas the e↵ect of
inequality in salary can be positive. Our experimental findings are consistent with the existence
of domain-contingent inequality aversion; we also find that inequality aversion in equity is more
severe than in salary because of the perceived scarcity of equity.
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1 Introduction
Human capital is the most critical asset of modern technology and service firms (Bresnahan et al.,
2002; David et al., 1998; Machin and Van Reenen, 1998). Compensation structures incentivize per-
formance and facilitate the hiring and retention of skilled employees and managers (Cappelen et al.,
2016; Larkin and Leider, 2012; Lazear, 2000). Compensation packages may include a combination
of direct salary, starting bonuses, end-of-year performance bonuses, equity grants or stock options,
and non-pecuniary benefits (e.g., free food, gym membership, etc.). Recent research reveals that
cash-based performance pay has fallen out of favor for innovation production employees (Ederer
and Manso, 2013). Instead, risk-bearing compensation schemes, such as equity grants and stock
options, have gained popularity in many industries, especially in the computer, software, internet,
telecommunications, and networking fields (Anderson et al., 2000; Frye, 2004; Ittner et al., 2003;
Sesil et al., 2007).
Despite this shift in recent decades toward equity plans to reward high-skilled labor, particu-
larly among technology startups, there is little consensus on how equity should be allocated among
employees with di↵erent ranks or functions. Research has been limited to within-firm equity dis-
tribution, and the few existing studies mainly focus on the equity split among top management
or founders (e.g., Breugst et al., 2015; Ensley et al., 2007; Hellmann and Wasserman, 2016). In
particular, when equity compensation is used in conjunction with cash salary, traditional theories
for firms’ motives of o↵ering equity, which include retaining talent (Fama, 1980), easing liquidity
constraints (Myers and Majluf, 1984), and incentivizing performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976),
suggest that workers with higher rank or more important function should receive compensation
packages more heavily weighted in equity.
However, our empirical analysis of 4,744 compensation packages o↵ered by 1,034 firms from
AngelList, a popular, online startup job-posting site in the startup technology sector, fails to find
evidence for a pattern predicted by these traditional theories. Instead, we document that 22% of
firms adopt an equality-in-equity strategy, i.e., they o↵er potential employees the same levels of
equity compensation but di↵erent cash salaries across di↵erent job ranks and functions.1 Within
a firm that adopts the equality-in-equity strategy, when a higher ranking job receives higher salary
1The analysis is documented in Appendix A.
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but the same equity as a lower ranking job, the compensation package for the higher ranking job
is more heavily weighted in salary, contrary to traditional theories.
Our finding of compression in equity compensation but not in cash salary is surprising for two
reasons. First, existing studies of firm benefits of equitable compensation have focused solely on
pay to employees with the same job description (Roth and Xing, 1994; Roth et al., 2006) or same
productivity levels (Clark et al., 2010). For workers performing at di↵erent productivity levels,
experimental evidence so far does not support gains from compensation compression (Charness
and Kuhn, 2007).
Second, existing theories on the advantages of compensation compression do not distinguish be-
tween di↵erent forms of pay (Akerlof and Yellen, 1988, 1990; Frank, 1984; Levine, 1991). Moreover,
few studies investigate how equality in one type of compensation may produce di↵erent e↵ects from
equality of another compensation. Yet, anecdotal evidence suggests that individuals may dislike
outright equality in salary with their coworkers2 while equality appears to be more acceptable in
equity allocation. Joel Spolsky, the co-founder and CEO of the portfolio company Stack Exchange,
asserts, “Fairness, and the perception of fairness, is much more valuable than owning a large stake,”
and he claims that equity should be “split equally among everyone in the layer” where the layer
only refers to time of joining the firm.
Motivated by the empirical puzzle of an asymmetric compression in equity and salary, we aim
to shed light on two questions: Do workers have distinct preferences for equality in equity versus
equality in salary? If so, what are the mechanisms driving the di↵erent equality preferences? In this
paper, we propose a novel behavioral theory of domain-contingent inequality aversion.3 Inspired by
the notion of inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), we argue that workers dislike inequality
and their preferences may di↵er depending on the type of compensation. The established construct
of inequality aversion stems from behavioral observations that individuals are concerned about their
social standing and economic payo↵s relative to others (Bracha et al., 2015; Bolton and Ockenfels,
2000; Charness and Grosskopf, 2001; Clark and Oswald, 1996; Marr and Thau, 2014), and they
2Rachel Sugar, “A CEO raised his company’s minimum wage to $70,000 a year, and some employees quit because
of it,” Business Insider, July 31, 1025, http://www.businessinsider.com/.
3“Domain” typically refers to the context of decision-making when it appears in the discussion of context-dependent
risk preferences (Bonem et al., 2015; Weber et al., 2002) and social preferences (Bao and Ho, 2015; De Oliveira et al.,
2009). Furthermore, Schoemaker (1990) uses the phrase “payo↵ domain” to distinguish gains from losses in monetary
outcomes. In our theory, “domain” refers to the payo↵ form, and more specifically equity versus salary, which can
be a particular context for social preference to take place.
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prefer equality under certain circumstances.4
Our concept of domain-contingent inequality aversion extends the basic theory by postulating
that workers view cash salary and equity compensation as distinct domains that impact individual
inequality aversion di↵erently, that is, employees may dislike inequality in formal equity ownership
more than inequality in cash salary.
We incorporate domain-contingent inequality aversion into a theoretical model to derive the
results for workers’ e↵ort choices. We show that inequality in equity has a negative asymmetric
e↵ect on e↵ort while inequality in salary, under some circumstances, may have a positive asymmetric
e↵ect on e↵ort. The negative asymmetric e↵ect of inequality in equity distinguishes the domain-
contingent inequality aversion model from standard models of inequality aversion.
Furthermore, we hypothesize that domain-contingent inequality aversion is driven by the per-
ceived scarcity of equity, and the negative asymmetric e↵ect of inequality in equity is only present
when equity is presented as scarce. Most firms have a limited amount of equity—a set percentage
of the firm in their options pool—to distribute,5 and employees may then perceive equity rewards
as a scarce commodity.6 Research has shown that scarcity can induce higher consumer preference
(Balachander et al., 2009). While few works in economics link a scarcity bias and social preferences,
Hegtvedt (1987) and E↵ron and Miller (2011) have found that people are less selfish with respect
to distributions when rewards are scarce. Hence, we hypothesize that equality in equity ownership
matters more to workers than equality in cash salary because equity is perceived as scarce. Fi-
nally, we discuss the implications of domain-contingent inequality aversion for firms by assuming
that management takes such worker preferences into account and optimizes their compensation
strategies over an entire group of employees. We argue that, in the presence of a negative asym-
metric e↵ect of inequality in equity and a positive asymmetric e↵ect of inequality in salary, the
equality-in-equity strategy is optimal for firms with a fixed equity compensation budget.
To test our model predictions and hypotheses, we conduct an experiment to determine whether
a domain-contingent inequality aversion exists and whether such worker preferences are driven by
4Mohnen et al. (2008) find that inequality aversion can lead to peer pressure in teams when individual contribu-
tion to the team is transparent. Bellemare et al. (2008) find that there is strong aversion to inequality at other’s
disadvantage using a representative sample from the Dutch population, and that such aversion rises with age and
falls with education level.
5The creation and issuing of additional options beyond the existing options pool are costly to prior employees
because the new options dilute their percentage ownership of the firm.
6“Equity Compensation in An Era of Scarcity”, Solium Capital, accessed November 26, 2016.
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equity scarcity. In a within-subject design, participants experience 7 scenarios of group production
with di↵erent compensation schemes that mimic salary and equity. We complement the experiment
with a between-subject design to test whether the mechanism of equity scarcity drives domain-
contingent inequality aversion. In the control group, participants view equity in a non-scarce format,
i.e., experiment points. In the treatment group, participants view equity in a scarce format, i.e.,
as a percentage. Our experiment o↵ers evidence for the existence of domain-contingent inequality
aversion, and further finds evidence that inequality aversion in equity is more severe because of a
perceived scarcity of equity instead of cash.
This paper makes several contributions. First, motivated by an empirical phenomenon in the
high-risk, high-growth startup setting, we propose a behavioral theory of domain-contingent in-
equality aversion, which represents a new consideration for the labor economics and management
literature on the subject of employee incentive compensation and its link to individual utility7
and firm performance.8. We are the first to highlight the distinction between inequality in equity
compensation and inequality in salary compensation. Second, we provide experimental results for
how individuals respond to intra-group compensation distributions when di↵erent types of payo↵s
are used simultaneously. Using output share to mimic equity and flat payment to mimic salary,
we are also the first to test experimentally how compression in output share a↵ects individual con-
tribution when flat payment is present and when the value of the share is uncertain. Third, we
shed light on the mechanism of domain-contingent inequality aversion by linking scarcity bias and
social preferences. Fourth, as equity is becoming increasingly a popular form of compensation in
innovation industries, our findings have practical implications, particularly for technology startups,
for the optimal allocation of equity among their high-skilled employees.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents our theoretical model of domain-contingent
7From the worker’s viewpoint, theory has mainly looked at how compensation distribution a↵ects utility (Fehr
and Schmidt, 1999). Empirical results using proxies for utility have been mixed. For example, Clark and Oswald
(1996) suggest that equality increases reported job satisfaction, but Charness and Grosskopf (2001) find that reported
happiness does not respond to equality.
8From the firm’s viewpoint, theoretical work has suggested that firms with less variance in compensation will have
more harmonious labor relations, thus leading to more worker e↵ort and output (Akerlof and Yellen, 1988, 1990),
and that narrowing within-firm wage dispersion can increase cohesiveness and workplace productivity (Levine, 1991)
Some have noticed that disparities in pay may induce discontent among employees and result in uncooperative and
unaccommodating work behavior (Pencavel, 2012). However, empirical evidence so far on the e↵ect of equality on
aggregate performance is not optimistic. Earlier experimental work finds negative consequences for team performance
when agents are paid equal shares of the team’s output (Isaac and Walker, 1988; Nalbantian and Schotter, 1997),
and more recent study does not support the proposition that worker e↵ort responds to coworkers’ wages (Charness
and Kuhn, 2007).
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inequality aversion. Section 3 lays out the experimental design and Section 4 discusses the results.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical Model
We present a model of domain-contingent inequality aversion that builds upon a standard group
production model with stochastic output and convex cost function (Nalbantian and Schotter, 1997)
but adopts a di↵erent stochastic form. Adapting the fairness model of Benjamin (2015), we assume
inequality aversion of the form in Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Under domain-contingency, we write
distinct functions for inequality aversion in salary and inequality aversion in equity. We employ
this model to explain existing empirical observations and generate further hypotheses that we test
experimentally.
2.1 Model Setup
We consider two risk-neutral9 workers i 2 {1, 2} in a firm engaged in a group task with output V˜
exerting e↵ort ei with homogeneous cost function C(ei) = e2i .
10 The individual payo↵ consists of
a salary xi and an equity payo↵ yi which is a share of the group output V˜ . The group production
process is a binary lottery where
V˜ =
8>><>>:
V, with probability p(e1 + e2) Group “Succeeds”
0, otherwise. Group “Fails”
assuming p(e1 + e2) = k(e1 + e2) with k > 0.11 The value of equity is yiV˜ for share yi.
Without loss of generality, we consider the problem from the perspective of worker i = 1. Given
compensation structure x1, x2, y1, y2 and worker 2’s e↵ort choice e2, the problem faced by worker
1 is
max
e1
Eu(e1; e2, x1, x2, y1, y2) = p(e1 + e2) · uSuccess + [1  p(e1 + e2)] · uFailure (1)
9Risk neutrality is an appropriate simplifying assumption for deriving predictions to be tested in a laboratory
setting since people are approximately risk neutral when stakes are small (as is in the lab) according to the expected-
utility theory.
10We choose this specification for model tractability and also for a convex cost function.
11We choose this linear specification for model tractability and also for a concave probability function
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where uSuccess = x1 + y1V   C(e1)  (DX +DY ), and (2)
uFailure = x1   C(e1) DX . (3)
DX represents the worker’s inequality aversion in the salary domain and has the form
DX = ↵x
⇣
max{(x2   C(e2))  (x1   C(e1)), 0}
⌘
(4)
+  x
⇣
max{(x1   C(e1))  (x2   C(e2)), 0}
⌘
. (5)
↵x is the degree of inequality aversion in salary when the worker is in a disadvantageous position,
i.e., having lower utility than the other worker in the salary domain, and  x denotes the degree
of inequality aversion in salary when the worker is in an advantageous position, i.e., having higher
utility than the other worker in the salary domain.
The variable DY represents the worker’s inequality aversion in the equity domain when the
group “succeeds” and takes the form
DY = ↵y
⇣
max{(y2   y1)V, 0}
⌘
+  y
⇣
max{(y1   y2)V ), 0}
⌘
. (6)
DY only appears when the group succeeds, as group output and value of equity is zero when
the group fails. ↵y is interpreted as the degree of inequality aversion in equity when the worker
is in a disadvantageous equity position, and  y denotes the degree of inequality aversion in equity
when the worker is in an advantageous equity position.
In the model, we assume all workers are self interested, and thus are more inequality-averse
when they are in the disadvantageous position than when they are in the advantageous position
(↵x >  x,↵y >  y). We also assume that both disadvantageous and advantageous workers are
averse to inequality, but only to an extent: the disutility caused by inequality cannot exceed the
value of such inequality (1 > ↵x,↵y, x, y > 0). Finally, both disadvantageous and advantageous
workers are more averse to inequality in equity than to inequality in salary (↵y > ↵x, y >  x).
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2.2 Implications for the Worker
Let the utility-maximizing e↵ort of worker i be denoted by e⇤i . Without loss of generality, we focus
on e⇤1. We first examine how the compensation package (salary and equity) of worker 1 and the
package of the other worker a↵ect worker 1’s equilibrium e↵ort choice. These are standard results
and are left to the Appendix (see Propositions B.1-B.3). Following Benjamin (2015), we derive our
key results in Propositions 1-2 which predict how workers respond to inequality in equity under
di↵erent model assumptions. All proofs are relegated to the Supplementary Appendix.
Proposition 1. Optimal E↵ort Response to Inequality in Equity Under Domain-
Continent Inequality Aversion. Let y2 = y0, then
limy1"y0
@e⇤1
@y1
limy1#y0
@e⇤1
@y1
> 1. Relative to equality in equity
(y1 = y2 = y0), e↵ort responds more to equity cuts (y1 < y0) than to equity raises (y1 > y0).
Inequality in equity has a negative asymmetric e↵ect on e↵ort. A change in y1 a↵ects the choice
of e⇤1, and the change in the choice of e⇤1 in turn may a↵ect inequality aversion in the salary domain,
causing e⇤1 to readjust. By the assumption that the employee is more inequality averse in the
equity domain, we conclude the e↵ect of equity must outweigh the e↵ect of salary. Moreover, the
assumption that the worker is self interested suggests that disadvantageous equity positions (equity
cuts) outweigh the e↵ect of advantageous equity positions (equity raises), thus yielding Proposition
1. As we note in the proof of this proposition, the negative asymmetric e↵ect is stronger (i.e.,
limy1"y0
@e⇤1
@y1
limy1#y0
@e⇤1
@y1
is larger) when ↵y or  y is larger.
The negative asymmetric e↵ect of inequality in equity, stated in Proposition 1, is a unique
result of our domain-contingent inequality aversion model. In the next proposition, we compare
this result with implications from a model with no inequality aversion (i.e., no inequality aversion
terms at all in the utility function) and a model with non-domain-contingent inequality aversion
(i.e., no separation of salary and equity payo↵ in the inequality aversion terms).
Proposition 2. Optimal E↵ort Response to Inequality in Equity Absent Domain-
Contingent Inequality Aversion. Let y2 = y0. Let e˜1 be worker 1’s optimal e↵ort choice
absent inequality aversion. Let eˆ1 be worker 1’s optimal e↵ort choice under non-domain-contingent
inequality aversion. Then
limy1"y0
@e˜1
@y1
limy1#y0
@e˜1
@y1
= 1 and
limy1"y0
@eˆ1
@y1
limy1#y0
@eˆ1
@y1
= 1. Relative to equality in equity
(y1 = y2 = y0), e↵ort responds symmetrically to equity cuts (y1 < y0) and equity raises (y1 > y0).
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In contrast to the prediction of the domain-contingent inequality aversion model, Proposition
2 says that models absent domain-contingent inequality aversion predict a symmetric e↵ect of
inequality in equity on e↵ort. Propositions 1 and 2 together suggest that the negative asymmetric
e↵ect of inequality in equity is uniquely derived from the domain-contingent inequality aversion
assumption. Models without this assumption do not exhibit this e↵ect. Therefore, we conclude
that this negative asymmetric e↵ect is a unique manifestation of domain-contingent inequality
aversion.
We also derive additional results regarding how the employee responds to inequality in salary
(see Proposition B.4) and how the worker’s response to inequality in salary relates to his response to
inequality in equity (see Proposition B.5). These results are left to the Appendix. Furthermore, we
hypothesize that the mechanism for domain-contingent inequality aversion is a perceived scarcity
of equity. In other words, workers dislike inequality in equity more than inequality in salary
because equity is viewed as scarce. When equity is not perceived as scarce, workers no longer
experience more inequality aversion in the equity domain. Therefore, we hypothesize that domain-
contingent inequality aversion appears only when equity is perceived as a scarce reward. According
to Propositions 1 and 2, domain-contingent inequality aversion can be tested through the existence
of a negative asymmetric e↵ect of inequality in equity, so we hypothesize that such an e↵ect only
appears when equity is viewed as scarce.
Hypothesis 1. Domain-Contingent Inequality Aversion Under Scarce Equity. The neg-
ative asymmetric e↵ect of inequality in equity is only present when equity is shown as a scarce
reward.
2.3 Implications for the Firm
The propositions and hypothesis in Section 2.2 provide testable predictions for our laboratory
experiment and also have implications for compensation decisions. Proposition 1 is particularly
pertinent for a firm having a fixed employee equity pool, a situation faced by most firms issuing
equity compensation. Firms that allocate a fixed total equity to employees devise a scheme to
maximizes the total e↵ort of their workers. According to Proposition 1, the negative asymmetric
e↵ect of inequality in equity on e↵ort suggests that equitable distribution of equity is the optimal
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compensation strategy. The optimal strategy of salary compensation is less clear since firms may
not set aside a fixed amount of cash for their employees. Yet, salary dispersion may be justified
when inequality in salary has a positive asymmetric e↵ect on e↵ort under conditions specified
in Proposition B.4. In the presence of a negative asymmetric e↵ect of inequality in equity and
a positive asymmetric e↵ect of inequality in salary, the equality-in-equity strategy (same equity
but di↵erent salary) is the optimal strategy for firms.12 According to Hypothesis 1, such negative
asymmetric e↵ect should be present only when equity is presented in its scarcity form which suggests
our next hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2. Total Group E↵ort. Equality in equity induces the highest total group e↵ort
only when equity is shown as a scarce reward.
Moreover, while our model considers a two-worker case, the implications for equity compensation
can be easily extended to any firm with a fixed employee equity pool. The case of companies
consisting of two worker types of equal numbers is clearly a direct extension of the two-worker case.
In fact, even when there are unequal numbers of multiple worker types, any deviation from general
equality will lead to a reduction in total e↵ort in the presence of a negative asymmetric e↵ect of
inequality in equity.13
3 Experimental Design
We test the predictions of our model and the hypotheses using an experimental design borrowed
from Charness and Kuhn (2007) and Kessler (2010), which enables us to impose a quadratic e↵ort
cost function and a linear production function to match the model specifications.
12The current version of this paper focuses on predictions for workers’ e↵ort choices since our lab experiment only
examines responses to predetermined compensation packages. In future work, we plan to derive equilibrium results
by solving the firm’s problem rigorously as in Benjamin (2015).
13Suppose there are T types of workers. at is the number of workers of type t, t = 1, 2, ..., T . Suppose the equity pool
for workers is fixed. Under equality in equity, each worker receives equity share of the total pool y = 100PT
t=1 at
. Let e be
the optimal e↵ort provided by each worker when everyone receives y. Under inequality in equity, suppose there are S
types of workers getting less than y, then there are T S types of workers getting more than or equal to y with at least
one type of workers getting more than y. Without loss of generality, let t = 1, ..., S be the types of workers getting
less than y. Let yt be the equity share of the total pool received by a type t worker and let et be the optimal e↵ort
provided by this type of worker. Since the equity pool is fixed, we have
PS
t=1 atyt+
PT
t=S+1 atyt = 100 = y
PT
t=1 at,
thus yielding
PS
t=1 at(yt y) =
PT
t=S+1 at(y yt). In the presence of negative asymmetric e↵ect of equality in equity,
we have total increase in e↵orttotal decrease in e↵ort =
PS
t=1 at(et e)PT
t=S+1 at(e et)
<
PS
t=1 at(yt y)PT
t=S+1 at(y yt)
= 1, so there is a reduction in total e↵ort.
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3.1 Participants
We recruited 960 workers from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) to participate in a 15-minute
study via Qualtrics during October and November 2016. MTurk workers have become a useful
sample in the study of worker e↵ort and multi-person games (Chandler and Kapelner, 2013; Dreber
et al., 2013; Rand et al., 2015; Jordan et al., 2016). In particular, many studies have shown there
are no significant di↵erences between the experimental results from MTurk and those derived from
physical lab settings for various types of economic games (Horton et al., 2011; Suri and Watts,
2011; Amir et al., 2012).
To insure participants pay attention to experimental materials, we conducted comprehension
checks at the beginning of the experiment after the participants read the instructions. Each par-
ticipant needed to correctly answer comprehension questions related to the instructions in order to
proceed with the study. These questions were designed to make sure that participants understood
the rules of the experiment and the factors a↵ecting their earnings. When questions were answered
incorrectly, participants were o↵ered a new set of comprehension questions. Participants who failed
three attempts were excluded from the study and were only paid their guaranteed payment. The
comprehension checks screened out 186 participants, resulting in a sample size of 774 workers.
3.2 Procedures
Participants were told this study investigated individual decision making and behavior. They were
informed that they could earn bonus money in addition to their guaranteed payment ($0.25) based
on their decisions in the study. The experiment had a within-subject design with each participant
experiencing 7 scenarios (in a random order) of group production with di↵erent compensation
schemes. In each scenario, a participant was paired with a random partner, and each received a
flat payment to mimic salary and a share of group output to mimic equity. Payo↵s were denoted
in experiment points with each point worth $0.001. Compensations for both people were public.
Then, both participants had the opportunity to increase the probability of group success at a
personal cost. Group output was V = 500 if the project succeeded but was zero if the project
failed. In the end, one of the 7 scenarios was randomly selected to determine the final earnings
of the participants. Compensation depended on decisions made by both participants in the group
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and the realization of group output. Basic demographic information including gender, education,
race, and work experience was collected at the end of the experiment. Instructions were conveyed
in a neutral language without mentioning concepts of e↵ort, equity, salary, firm, or worker.
3.3 Treatments
The experiment was further complemented by a between-subject design to test the specific mecha-
nism that drives domain-contingent inequality aversion. There are two groups: control and scarcity
treatment. The only di↵erence between these two groups is the presentation of the output share. To
induce a perception of a “scarce” output share, we presented output share as a percentage instead
of in experiment points. For example, while workers in the control group were presented with an
o↵er of 250 experiment points as their share of a total group output of 500 points, workers in the
scarcity treatment group were presented with the equivalent 50% of output share. In principle, the
description of the output share does not change the real value of the output share, but a percentage
form facilitates the relative comparison of share size between participants (Dieckmann et al., 2009;
Waters et al., 2006), and thus driving the salience of the finiteness of the 100% output. A fixed
100% means that there is a limited supply of output to be shared, and consequently increases the
perception of scarcity.14
Compensation levels are displayed in Table 1. There were three possible levels of flat payment
(high, medium, low) and three possible levels of output share (high, medium, low). The control
group comprised 387 workers , for which output share was presented in experiment points. 387
workers were in the scarcity treatment group, for which output share was presented in percentage
form.
——————–Insert Table 1——————–
Table 2 summarizes the seven individual-level scenarios experienced by each participant (in a
random order). We can collapse the individual-level scenarios into group-level conditions based
on output share and flat payment equality/inequality. There are four group-level conditions in
total: general equality, equality in share, equality in flat payment, and general inequality. We call a
14Limiting supply is a common intervention to induce perception of scarcity in experiments (E↵ron and Miller,
2011; Mittone and Savadori, 2009).
12
higher payo↵ in either flat payment or output share as an advantageous position and a lower payo↵
is designated a disadvantageous position. Each scenario is named first by the group-level condition,
and then by the advantageous or disadvantageous position of the participant. Note that we set the
value of inequality in share for a successful project, e.g., (60%   40%) ⇥ 500 = 100, equal to the
inequality in flat payment, i.e., 300  200 = 100.
——————–Insert Table 2——————–
In each scenario, participants made a private decision to increase the probability of group project
success at a personal cost. The cost schedule shown in Table 3 was identical for all participants
across all scenarios. We refer to the number of points sacrificed to increase project success proba-
bility as one’s contribution. There are 5 possible contribution choices that increase quadratically
for each increment in success probability. The square root of this privately stated level of contri-
bution is interpreted as our measure of unobservable e↵ort. Each unit of e↵ort would increase the
probability of success linearly by k = 4%. This type of stated e↵ort measure is common in the
experimental economics literature, especially studies on worker compensation and productivity in
group production (Nalbantian and Schotter, 1997; Charness and Kuhn, 2007; Clark et al., 2010;
Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2011). The advantage of our e↵ort measure is that we could exactly
impose a quadratic e↵ort cost function and a linear production function in the experiment and
directly test our predictions in Section 2.
——————–Insert Table 3——————–
4 Results
We first describe simple summary statistics of individual e↵ort. We then report a regression analysis
that tests our model predictions regarding domain-contingent inequality aversion and evaluates our
hypothesis that perceived equity scarcity is the mechanism driving the domain-contingency. We
conclude the section by providing suggestive evidence for the e↵ect of domain-contingent inequality
aversion on total group e↵ort.
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4.1 Summary Statistics of Individual E↵ort
Table 4 reports summary statistics for all individual-level scenarios. In both control and scarcity
treatment groups, individual e↵ort is higher in high payo↵ (“advantageous”) scenarios and lower in
low payo↵ (“disadvantageous”) scenarios, relative to the general equality scenario. At the individual
scenario level, the di↵erences between the control group and the scarcity treatment group are
not statistically significant, except for the general inequality (disadvantageous) scenario in which
individuals in the scarcity treatment group provide less e↵ort than those in the control group on
average.
——————–Insert Table 4——————–
Figure 1 shows the distribution of individual e↵ort choices under each scenario, pooling the
control and the scarcity treatment groups. We group the 7 individual scenarios into 4 general
group-level conditions: general equality, equality in share, equality in flat payment, and general
inequality. The distributions tend to shift to the right for workers in the advantageous scenarios.
Specifically, workers with both higher flat payment and higher output share than their partners (in
the general inequality condition) exhibit the largest rightward shift. The rightward shift to higher
e↵ort choices also is slightly more prominent in the equality-in-share condition than in the equality-
in-flat-payment condition. On the other hand, the distributions tend to shift to the left for workers
in the disadvantageous scenarios. In particular, workers with both low flat payment and low output
share than their partners (in the general inequality condition) exhibit the largest leftward shift.
Comparing the equality-in-share condition and the equality-in-flat-payment condition, we see that
fewer workers choose the lowest e↵ort and more workers choose the highest e↵ort when there is no
inequality in share. Figure 2 shows the average individual e↵ort choice by the grouped scenarios.
In the equality-in-flat-payment condition (but inequality in share), workers in the disadvantageous
position on average provide less e↵ort than those in the disadvantageous position of the equality-
in-share condition. Workers in the advantageous position on average provide less e↵ort than those
in the advantageous position of the equality-in-share condition, though not significantly so.
——————–Insert Figure 1——————–
——————–Insert Figure 2——————–
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These findings provide some evidence that inequality in di↵erent domains can a↵ect e↵ort
provision di↵erently. Relative to the general equality condition, redistributing flat payment within
the group while holding share equal appears to have a symmetric e↵ect on e↵ort. That is, higher
flat payment increases e↵ort by approximately the same amount that lower flat payment decreases
e↵ort. However, relative to the general equality condition, redistributing output share within the
group while holding flat payment equal appears to have a negative asymmetric e↵ect on e↵ort.
Lower share decreases e↵ort more than the increase in e↵ort from higher share.
We further examine how e↵ort responds to di↵erent compensation schemes by collapsing the 7
individual scenarios based on the level of output share and flat payment respectively. Table 5 Panel
A reports the summary statistics for all output share levels, and Panel B displays statistics for all
flat payment levels. Panel A shows that e↵ort on average responds to high and low output share
almost symmetrically relative to medium level in the control group but responds to low output
share more negatively in the treatment group. From Panel B, we see that e↵ort responds more
negatively to low flat payment in the treatment group compared to the control group and, at the
same time, responds more positively to high flat payment, though not significantly so for the latter.
The result in Panel A, illustrated in Figure 3, reveals that the treatment group exhibits a more
prominent negative asymmetry on e↵ort than the control group, i.e., the di↵erence between the low
share average and the baseline is larger than the di↵erence between the high share average and the
baseline. By Propositions 1 and 2, this negative asymmetric e↵ect of inequality in equity provides
evidence for domain-contingent inequality aversion. This finding is consistent with Hypothesis 1
which says that such e↵ect should only appear in the treatment group for which equity is perceived
with scarcity. In the next section, we formally evaluate the predictions of our domain-contingent
inequality aversion model and the proposed mechanism of equity scarcity based on our experimental
results.
——————–Insert Table 5——————–
——————–Insert Figure 3——————–
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4.2 Domain-Contingent Inequality Aversion under Equity Scarcity
First, we perform a full-sample regression analysis to consider whether workers experience domain-
contingent inequality aversion regarding equity and salary predicted by Propositions 1 and 2. We
then conduct subsample analysis for the control group and the scarcity treatment group to test
Hypothesis 1 that domain-contingent inequality aversion is driven by the perceived scarcity of
equity.
Table 6 reports regression results examining how di↵erent levels of compensation a↵ect indi-
vidual e↵ort choice. According to Propositions 1 and 2, the domain-contingent inequality aversion
model predicts a negative asymmetric e↵ect of inequality in equity, or in other words,  1 < | 3|. In
contrast, models with non-domain-contingent inequality aversion and no inequality aversion predict
a symmetric e↵ect, i.e.,  1 = | 3|. Consistent with the model prediction under domain-contingent
inequality aversion, we find a negative asymmetric e↵ect of inequality in equity. The estimated  1
is smaller than the absolute value of the estimated  3 (Columns (1)-(3)). In other words, workers
respond more to low share than to high share. Such negative asymmetric e↵ect is statistically
significant at the 10% level for the fixed e↵ects specification in Column (3) (p-value of the F-test
is 0.0649), and presents evidence for the existence of domain-contingent inequality aversion as
predicted by Proposition 1.
——————–Insert Table 6——————–
Experiment Finding 1. Consistent with the prediction of the domain-contingent inequality
aversion model, inequality in equity has a negative asymmetric e↵ect on e↵ort, i.e., e↵ort responds
more to low share than to high share.
Furthermore, recall that Hypothesis 1 says that the domain-contingency is driven by perceived
scarcity of equity, and predicts that  1 < | 3| for the treatment group while  1 = | 3| for the control
group. In Table 6, we see that the negative asymmetric e↵ect of inequality in equity becomes more
prominent in the treatment subsample (Column (4)) with a p-value of 0.0593 for the F-test, but
turns out to be statistically insignificant in the control subsample (Column (5)) with a p-value of
0.4559 for the F-test. Hence, the test confirms Hypothesis 1 since the domain-contingency inequality
aversion only appears in the treatment group for which equity is a scarce reward.
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Experiment Finding 2. We find that domain-contingent inequality aversion (i.e., more severe
inequality aversion in the output share domain than in the flat payment domain) only appears
when equity is presented in the scarcity format but does not appear when equity is presented in
the same format as the flat payment.
Table 6 also provides results having implications regarding the parameter space for the degree
of inequality aversion in the two separate domains. First, notice that the e↵ect of inequality in
flat payment appears to be positive asymmetric since high flat payment increases e↵ort more than
the drop in low flat payment ( 2 > | 4|), though this asymmetric e↵ect is marginally statistically
significant at the 10% level.15 Second, relative to general equality, low share induces a larger
decrease in e↵ort than low flat payment (| 3| > | 4|) even when the share reduction is at most equal
to that of the flat payment reduction.16 The di↵erence is statistically significant at the 1% level.17
Third, we see that e↵ort responds less to an increase in share than to an increase in flat payment
( 1 <  2), though not significantly so.18 According to Propositions B.4 and B.5, given the model
assumption of domain-contingent inequality aversion, these results imply that ↵x    x  2↵x x.
4.3 Total Group E↵ort
Examining the group level outcomes, we test Hypothesis 2 that predicts that equality in equity
induces the highest total group e↵ort only when equity is shown as a scarce reward. In other words,
o↵ering the same equity but di↵erent salaries is the optimal firm compensation strategy only in
presence of domain-contingent inequality aversion.
Figure 4 plots the distributions of total group e↵ort under each group-level condition. Compared
to the general equality condition, the figure demonstrates that more groups provide the highest
possible e↵ort in the equality-in-share condition, and fewer groups do so in the equality-in-flat-
payment condition. Moreover, compared to the equality-in-share condition, more groups in the
equality-in-flat-payment condition are in the lower e↵ort range.
——————–Insert Figure 4——————–
15p value from F-test of the null hypothesis that  2 +  4 = 0 is 0.1082.
16The value of share reduction is at most (60%   50%) ⇥ 500 = 50. The value of flat payment reduction is
300  250 = 50.
17p-value from F-test of the null hypothesis that  3 =  4 is 0.0036.
18p-value from F-test of the null hypothesis that  1 =  2 is 0.4222.
17
Figure 5 also illustrates the average total group e↵ort across conditions. While average total
group e↵ort is the highest under the equality-in-share condition for the treatment group, group e↵ort
is lower than the average total group e↵ort under other conditions (general equality and general
inequality) for the control group. This finding, though not statistically significant, is consistent with
Hypothesis 2 that equality-in-share is the optimal compensation strategy (in the sense of inducing
the highest total group e↵ort) only when share is shown as a scarce reward in percentage form. A
regression analysis further supports this conclusion. Table 7 reports regression results examining
how total group e↵ort is a↵ected by di↵erent group-level conditions. We find that total group e↵ort
is higher under the equality-in-share condition relative to the equality-in-flat-payment condition
(Column (1)), and more so when we restrict to the scarcity treatment subsample. While we do not
have enough statistical significance for our estimates, the signs suggest that the equality-in-share
condition induces higher total e↵ort than all the other conditions only in the scarcity treatment
sample (i.e., when share is shown in the percentage form).
——————–Insert Figure 5——————–
——————–Insert Table 7——————–
These suggestive findings are consistent with the implications from our experimental results
in the previous section. Domain-contingent inequality aversion implies that inequality in output
share has a negative asymmetric e↵ect on e↵ort while inequality in flat payment can have a posi-
tive asymmetric e↵ect on e↵ort. As a result, the equality-in-share condition (but inequality in flat
payment) would induce the highest total group e↵ort in the presence of domain-contingent inequal-
ity aversion, i.e., in the treatment group, but not in the control group when domain-contingent
inequality aversion is absent.
5 Conclusion
Motivated by an empirical observation of equity compression but salary dispersion in employment
o↵ers posted online, we propose a behavioral model of domain-contingent inequality aversion. We
argue that workers dislike inequality in the equity domain more than salary inequality because of
the perceived scarcity of equity. In contrast to other models with non-domain-contingent inequality
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aversion or no inequality aversion, our model features a negative asymmetric e↵ect of inequality
in equity. This negative asymmetric e↵ect, coupled with a possible positive asymmetric e↵ect of
inequality in salary, suggests that the equality-in-equity compensation strategy could benefit firms.
Our experimental findings produce corroborating evidence for the existence of domain-contingent
inequality aversion, and further demonstrate that such domain-contingency is largely driven by a
perception of equity scarcity.
Our experiment enables us to focus on the proposed mechanism of perceived scarcity of equity.
The design screens out many alternative mechanisms, such as a failure to recognize the importance
of equity (since most employees do not understand the value of the options they hold),19 di↵erential
bargaining power over equity versus salary, distinct information structures (salary information is
likely confidential while equity information is likely public knowledge), and overoptimism about
the equity value (Bergman and Jenter, 2007; Oyer and Schaefer, 2005) since both equity and salary
are essential, non-negotiable, public, and bounded in our design. Our results, however, do not rule
out two other potential mechanisms for why equity and salary occupy separate domains. Perhaps
equity di↵ers from salary because of its non-pecuniary benefits, such as a sense of ownership and
legitimacy of status (Graham et al., 2002; Hamilton, 2000). Also, equity likely might be viewed as a
current asset while cash might just be viewed as current income, in which case cash and equity are
in di↵erent mental accounts that interact di↵erently with individual inequality aversion (Shefrin
and Thaler, 1988). These alternatives would complement the view of domain-contingent inequality
aversion.
The model explored in the paper can be extended to incorporate more realistic features. For
instance, we can consider status-seeking preferences (i.e.,  x, y < 0), risk-averse workers, or work-
ers with productivity di↵erences to study how the conclusions from our model can be generalized.
To address external validity concerns of the experimental findings and to test the boundary condi-
tions of our theory, we intend to conduct a series of enhanced lab studies in the future. First, our
current design is neutrally framed to limit contextual cues and avoid established behavior patterns
(Charness and Kuhn, 2011). The design can be replicated in a context wherein worker-firm rela-
tionship is stated explicitly. For example, an artefactual field experiment involving a subject pool
19Casserly, M. (2013, March 8) Understanding Employee Equity: Every Startup’s Secret Weapon. Forbes. Retrieved
from http://www.forbes.com.
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of startup workers instead of undergraduate students would substantially mitigate external validity
concerns. Second, we would like to investigate whether our results would be robust to larger group
sizes or di↵erent group compositions (Isaac and Walker, 1988). Other extensions could develop
the production function with alternative production processes: a linear process with heterogeneous
worker impacts on output, a minimum game type of production function (Van Huyck et al., 1990),
a multiplicative production function that encompasses complementarity between workers’ e↵ort,
a production function that pays o↵ a large amount for output share with low probability even if
maximum e↵ort is supplied, etc. We also may incorporate a real e↵ort task that requires relatively
high skills. For instance, we can target a subject pool of students majoring in engineering and ask
them to perform a coding task for which we will measure the number of lines they code and the
quality of the code.
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Figure 1: Distributions of Individual E↵ort Choice by Scenario. This figure shows the
distribution of individual e↵ort choices under each scenario, pooling the control and the scarcity
treatment groups. The 7 individual-level scenarios are organized into 4 general group-level con-
ditions in 4 subfigures: general equality (top left), equality in share (top right), equality in flat
payment (bottom left), and general inequality (bottom right). The x-axis represents individual
e↵ort choice. Note that e↵ort choice is converted from individual contribution to the group and
ranges from 3 to 7. The y-axis and the histograms represent the fractions of each e↵ort choice
within the condition. In the equality-in-share condition, equality-in-flat-payment condition, and
general inequality condition, there are two types of scenarios: advantageous (white bars with black
outlines) and disadvantageous (light grey bars). In the equality-in-share condition, advantageous
refers to the scenario with high flat payment; disadvantageous denotes the scenario with low flat
payment. In the equality-in-flat-payment condition, advantageous scenario signifies the scenario
with high output share while disadvantageous scenario refers to the scenario with low output share.
In the general inequality condition, advantageous scenario refers to the scenario with both high flat
payment and high output share while disadvantageous scenario signifies the scenario with both low
flat payment and low output share.
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Figure 2: Average Individual E↵ort Choice by Scenario. This figure shows the average
individual e↵ort choice by scenarios, pooling the control and the scarcity treatment groups. The
7 individual-level scenarios are organized into 4 general group-level conditions in 4 bars: general
equality (first bar), equality in share (second bar), equality in flat payment (third bar), and general
inequality (fourth bar). The x-axis represents the condition. The y-axis represents the average
individual e↵ort. Error bars are displayed in black, representing 95% confidence intervals. In the
equality-in-share condition, equality-in-flat-payment condition, and general inequality condition,
there are two overlaid bars that represent two types of scenarios: advantageous (white bars with
black outlines) and disadvantageous (light grey bars). In the equality-in-share condition, advanta-
geous scenario refers to the scenario with high flat payment while disadvantageous scenario denotes
the scenario with low flat payment. In the equality-in-flat-payment condition, advantageous sce-
nario refers to the scenario with high output share while disadvantageous scenario signifies the
scenario with low output share. In the general inequality condition, advantageous scenario refers
to the scenario with both high flat payment and high output share while disadvantageous scenario
denotes the scenario with both low flat payment and low output share.
27
5
5.
2
5.
4
5.
6
5.
8
Av
er
ag
e 
In
di
vi
du
al
 E
ffo
rt
Control Treatment
High Share
Baseline
Low Share
Figure 3: Average Individual E↵ort Choice by Output Share Level. This figure shows the
averages of individual e↵ort at di↵erent compensation levels for the control and scarcity treatment
groups respectively, in support of the claim that the treatment group exhibits a more prominent
negative asymmetry on e↵ort than the control group. The x-axis represents the control and treat-
ment group. The y-axis represents the average individual e↵ort. All scenarios are organized by the
level of output share (high, medium, low). The green triangles represent the averages of individual
e↵ort for scenarios with high output share level. The blue solid line (labeled baseline) represents
the averages for scenarios with medium output share level. The red squares represent the averages
for scenarios with low output share level. All averages in the treatment group are normalized to the
control group baseline. Error bars are displayed for the high share and low share levels, representing
95% confidence intervals. For the medium share levels, the 95% confidence intervals are plotted in
blue dashed lines.
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Figure 4: Distributions of Total Group E↵ort by Condition. This figure shows the distri-
butions of total group e↵ort provision under each group level condition, pooling the control and
scarcity treatment groups. There are 4 general group-level conditions, shown in 4 subfigures: gen-
eral equality (top left), equality in share (top right), equality in flat payment (bottom left), and
general inequality (bottom right). The x-axis represents total group e↵ort, which is the sum of the
individual e↵ort choices of the two workers in the same group. Note that total group e↵ort ranges
from 6 to 14. The y-axis and the histograms represent the fractions of each group e↵ort choice
within the condition.
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Figure 5: Average Total Group E↵ort by Condition. This figure shows the average total
group e↵ort across conditions for the control and scarcity treatment groups respectively, in support
of Hypothesis 2. There are 4 general group-level conditions: general equality, equality in share,
equality in flat payment, and general inequality. The x-axis represents the group-level conditions.
The y-axis and the bars represent the average total group e↵ort. The control group averages are
in dark grey and the scarcity treatment group averages are in light grey. Error bars are displayed,
representing 95% confidence intervals. The black dashed horizontal line is added to compare the
equality-in-share condition with other conditions for the control group. The grey dotted horizontal
line is added to compare the equality-in-share condition with other conditions for the scarcity
treatment group.
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Table 1: Levels of Compensation. This table displays the possible levels of flat payment and
output share. There are three possible levels for either flat payment or output share: high, medium,
and low. Flat payment is shown in experiment points. Output share is presented in di↵erent formats
depending on the group. In the control group, output share if the project succeeds is shown in
experiment points. In the scarcity treatment group, output share is shown in percentage. Note
that the total group output is 500 points if the project succeeds, so the value of output share is the
same in both control and scarcity treatment groups.
Output Share
Level Flat Payment Control (Points) Scarcity Treatment (%)
High 300 300 60%
Medium 250 250 50%
Low 200 200 40%
Table 2: All Individual-Level Scenarios. This table shows the 7 individual-level scenarios. First
column provides the names of scenarios. Each scenario is named first by the group-level condition
(general equality, equality in share, equality in flat payment, general inequality) and then named by
the advantageous or disadvantageous position. Second and third columns show the amount of flat
payment (in experiment points) received by the participant and his partner respectively given the
scenario. Fourth and fifth columns show the amount of output share received by the participant
and his partner respectively given the scenario. Note that output share is shown in percentage
form for the scarcity treatment group and is shown in experiment points for the control group.
Flat Payment Output Share
Scenario Participant His Partner Participant His Partner
(a) General Equality 250 250 50% / 250 50% / 250
(b) Equality in Share (Advantageous) 300 200 50% / 250 50% / 250
(c) Equality in Share (Disadvantageous) 200 300 50% / 250 50% / 250
(d) Equality in Flat Payment (Advantageous) 250 250 60% / 300 40% / 200
(e) Equality in Flat Payment (Disadvantageous) 250 250 40% / 200 60% / 300
(f) General Inequality (Advantageous) 300 200 60% / 300 40% / 200
(g) General Inequality (Disadvantageous) 200 300 40% / 200 60% / 300
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Table 3: Cost Schedule for Increasing Probability of Group Project Success. This table
shows the cost schedule for increasing probability of group project success. Probability of success
can be increased linearly at a 4% interval. We refer to the number of points sacrificed to increase
project success probability as one’s contribution. There are 5 possible levels of contribution, in-
creasing quadratically. The square root of this privately stated level of contribution is interpreted
as our measure of unobservable e↵ort.
Increased Probability of Success 12% 16% 20% 24% 28%
Cost of Points (Contribution, Seen) 9 16 25 36 49
E↵ort Choice (
p
Contribution, Unseen) 3 4 5 6 7
Table 4: Summary Statistics: Means of Individual E↵ort Choice by Scenario. This
table reports the summary statistics for individual e↵ort choice by individual-level scenario. The
first column lists all the scenarios. The second and third columns report the means of individual
e↵ort and standard errors (in parentheses) for the control group and the scarcity treatment group
respectively. The fourth column shows the full sample averages and standard errors (in parentheses).
The last column reports the p-values from two-tailed t-tests between the control group and the
treatment group (*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01).
Group p-Value
Scenario Control Treatment Total (Control vs. Treatment)
(a) General Equality 5.47 5.42 5.45 0.55
(0.059) (0.062) (0.043)
(b) Equality in Share (Advantageous) 5.64 5.70 5.67 0.54
(0.060) (0.066) (0.044)
(c) Equality in Share (Disadvantageous) 5.22 5.19 5.21 0.77
(0.062) (0.065) (0.045)
(d) Equality in Flat Payment (Advantageous) 5.65 5.63 5.64 0.84
(0.061) (0.064) (0.044)
(e) Equality in Flat Payment (Disadvantageous) 5.10 5.10 5.10 0.93
(0.063) (0.067) (0.046)
(f) General Inequality (Advantageous) 5.80 5.87 5.84 0.45
(0.061) (0.064) (0.044)
(g) General Inequality (Disadvantageous) 5.12 4.92 5.02 0.04⇤⇤
(0.066) (0.066) (0.047)
Observations 387 387 774
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Table 5: Summary Statistics: Means of Individual E↵ort Choice by Compensation
Level. This table reports the summary statistics for individual e↵ort choice by compensation
level. In Panel A, each scenario is categorized based on the level of output share (high, medium,
low). In Panel B, each scenario is categorized based on the level of flat payment (high, medium,
low). Note that for both Panels A and B, there are 774 observations for high and low levels per group
(control or treatment), and 1,161 observations for medium levels per group (control or treatment).
For both panels, the first column lists the compensation level, the second and third columns report
the means of individual e↵ort and standard errors (in parentheses) for the control group and
the scarcity treatment group respectively, the fourth column shows the full sample averages and
standard errors (in parentheses), and the last column reports the p-values from two-tailed t-tests
between the control group and the treatment group (*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01).
Group p-Value
Level Control Treatment Total (Control vs. Treatment)
Panel A: Levels of Output Share
High 5.73 5.75 5.74 0.70
(0.043) (0.046) (0.031)
Medium 5.45 5.44 5.44 0.88
(0.035) (0.038) (0.026)
Low 5.11 5.01 5.06 0.13
(0.046) (0.047) (0.033)
Panel B: Levels of Flat Payment
High 5.72 5.78 5.75 0.33
(0.043) (0.046) (0.031)
Medium 5.41 5.38 5.40 0.62
(0.036) (0.038) (0.026)
Low 5.17 5.06 5.11 0.092⇤
(0.045) (0.047) (0.033)
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Table 6: Regression Results for Individual E↵ort. This table shows the regression results for
individual e↵ort, in support of Proposition 1 and Hypothesis 1. The dependent variable is individual
e↵ort. The independent variables include the indicators for each output share level (high, medium,
low) and for each flat payment level (high, medium, low). Medium share and medium flat payment
indicators are dropped as reference categories. Columns (1)-(3) report the estimates using the full
sample. Column (1) shows the estimates for the main regression specification. Column (2) shows
the estimates when additional individual controls are included. The individual controls include
gender, education, race, and whether the person has working experience or not. Column (3) shows
the estimates when individual fixed e↵ects are added. Column (4) shows the estimates for the
scarcity treatment group. Column (5) shows the estimates for the control group. Robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses, and are clustered at the individual level in the fixed e↵ects
regression (Column (3)). p-values from the F-tests on  1 = | 3| are reported.
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Dependent Variable: Individual E↵ort
Full Sample Subsamples
OLS OLS FE Treatment Control
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
High Share ( 1) 0.202⇤⇤⇤ 0.202⇤⇤⇤ 0.202⇤⇤⇤ 0.200⇤⇤⇤ 0.204⇤⇤⇤
(0.043) (0.042) (0.028) (0.040) (0.040)
High Flat Payment ( 2) 0.233⇤⇤⇤ 0.233⇤⇤⇤ 0.233⇤⇤⇤ 0.267⇤⇤⇤ 0.199⇤⇤⇤
(0.043) (0.042) (0.027) (0.039) (0.037)
Low Share ( 3) -0.276⇤⇤⇤ -0.275⇤⇤⇤ -0.276⇤⇤⇤ -0.305⇤⇤⇤ -0.247⇤⇤⇤
(0.044) (0.044) (0.027) (0.037) (0.040)
Low Flat Payment ( 4) -0.169⇤⇤⇤ -0.170⇤⇤⇤ -0.169⇤⇤⇤ -0.207⇤⇤⇤ -0.131⇤⇤⇤
(0.044) (0.043) (0.026) (0.037) (0.037)
F-test p-value ( 1 = | 3|) 0.2815 0.2872 0.0649⇤ 0.0593⇤ 0.4559
Constant 5.420⇤⇤⇤ 4.231⇤⇤⇤ 5.420⇤⇤⇤ 5.418⇤⇤⇤ 5.423⇤⇤⇤
(0.034) (0.211) (0.017) (0.024) (0.025)
Individual Controls No Yes No No No
Individual Fixed E↵ects No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,418 5,411 5,418 2,709 2,709
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Table 7: Regression Results for Total Group E↵ort. This table shows the regression results
for total group e↵ort, in support of Hypothesis 2. The dependent variable is total group e↵ort. The
independent variables include the indicators for all group-level conditions: general equality, equality
in share, equality in flat payment, and general inequality. The reference condition is equality-in-
share (but inequality in flat payment) and is hence dropped. Column (1) reports the estimates
using the full sample. Column (2) shows the estimates for the scarcity treatment group. Column
(3) shows the estimates for the control group. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Dependent Variable:
Total Group E↵ort
Full Sample Treatment Control
(1) (2) (3)
General Equality ( 1) 0.062 -0.098 0.219
(0.107) (0.159) (0.143)
Equality in Flat Payment ( 2) -0.178⇤⇤ -0.242⇤ -0.112
(0.089) (0.128) (0.125)
General Inequality ( 3) -0.013 -0.086 0.062
(0.090) (0.130) (0.125)
Constant 10.865⇤⇤⇤ 10.921⇤⇤⇤ 10.806⇤⇤⇤
(0.063) (0.092) (0.086)
Observations 2,696 1,350 1,346
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A Appendix: The Empirical Puzzle
Traditional theories in economics and finance provide a variety of motivations for why firms o↵er
equity compensation to employees. First, equity may be used as a retention tool. Fama (1980)
observes that a firm’s incentive system must be linked to firm performance to retain employees.
Equity is one type of compensation whose value is closely tied to firm performance. Moreover,
equity compensation, typically in the form of stock options, is often implemented with a cli↵ to
force employees to stay for at least one year and the options stop vesting when employees leave
(vesting usually happens over a 4-year period). In some cases, the stocks are clawed back when
employees leave to work for a competing firm or simply upon leaving. In this retention view, key
positions should have compensation packages weighted more in equity, where key positions are
those with high costs of replacement and are likely in higher ranks. Second, equity compensation
may address agency issues by incentivizing productivity and minimizing shirking. Since employees
will also be compensated based on how well the firm does, the profit-sharing aspect can align
interests and motivate employees, and hence reduce monitoring costs for the firm (Duncan, 2001;
Ehrenberg and Milkovich, 1987; Freeman et al., 2008; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Firms should
design more equity-weighted packages for high-ranking positions where the impact of individual
decision making on the organization is larger and concerns for moral hazard are more important.
Third, equity compensation enables a liquidity-constrained firm to retain cash for other purposes,
such as preempting new opportunities, reducing potential costs from financial distress, and serving
competitive purposes (Baskin, 1987; Denis and Sibilkov, 2010; John, 1993). This preference for cash
is suggested by the pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984), which says that firms would want
to use internal funds to finance investments. Therefore, firms experiencing cash flow di culties or
borrowing constraints and firms having stronger growth opportunities are more likely to substitute
equity for salary (Bettis et al., 2005; Opler et al., 1999). Substitution would be exploited more often
to pay key positions that should receive higher total compensation. Collectively, these theories
suggest that higher ranking jobs within a firm would receive compensation packages more heavily
weighted in equity.
However, using data on compensation packages from online startup job postings, we find a
pattern that cannot be explained by these theories. Many firms o↵er the same level of equity
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compensation to all new positions regardless of rank or function, and packages for higher ranking
positions are weighted less in equity. We label this phenomenon as “adopting an equality-in-equity
strategy” and propose a behavioral theory of domain-contingent inequality aversion in the following
sections that is consistent with this empirical observation.
Our cross-sectional sample contains job postings listed by startup companies on AngelList,20
an online platform that operates a popular registry of jobs, generally technology jobs, for startup
firms in the web and information technology space. Startups post jobs freely on AngelList and
each job description includes the role, location, qualifications, and compensation package, which
typically consists of salary and equity. Job candidates view the postings and can apply to the jobs
through the platform after creating a profile. According to AngelList, as of June 2016, the site has
attracted 539,076 active members with over 6,000 new candidates joining weekly. 18,780 startups
have joined AngelList to recruit talent and over 4,400 companies have successfully hired candidates
from the platform. According to Bernstein et al. (2017), over 60% of the young firms that raised a
seed round in 2013 have an AngelList profile,21 and thus the startups active on AngelList largely
represent young, private firms that drive job creation and productivity growth in the economy
(Decker et al., 2014; Haltiwanger et al., 2013).
Our job posting data are collected from AngelList in October 2015 during a relative boom period
for Silicon Valley and the information technology sector, resulting in a high demand for talent. We
screen the postings to include only non-co-founder and non-intern full-time positions in the U.S.
with positive salary compensation; equity compensation may be zero.22 Only firms that recruit
jobs at more than one job rank cross-sectionally are included. These screening criteria restrict our
sample to 4,744 job postings listed by 1,034 startup companies. The majority (96%) of the firms
in our sample has less than 200 employees and the average firm is 4.4 years old. The firms spread
across 37 di↵erent U.S. states and 38 industries are represented in our sample, such as information
technology, mobile, e-Commerce, leisure, finance, biotechnology, etc. We categorize each job listed
by these firms and assign a function and a rank based on the job title and detailed job description.
Our sample of postings cover four broad job functions and nine job ranks. The job functions include
20angel.co.
21Based on a comparison to the CrunchBase database.
227% of the observations list zero equity compensation. Our regression results in Table A.4 remain the same if we
exclude these observations.
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engineer roles (software, hardware, others), business roles (sales and marketing, client and customer
services, o ce and secretary role, operations, quality assurance, product, others), data roles, and
designer roles. The ranks include analyst, junior, senior, lead, manager, director, VP, head, and
chief. To address potential inconsistency in how firms name the rank of their positions, we also
assign an intra-firm rank to each job by comparing its rank to the ranks of other jobs listed by the
same firm.23 Table A.1 shows the number of job postings by job function and by job rank.
——————–Insert Table A.1——————–
In the job postings, firms list the corresponding salary and equity compensation.24 We categorize
firms based on their compensation strategy according to whether the firm pays its employees with
(1) di↵erent equity and salary compensation, (2) same equity but di↵erent salary compensation,
(3) same salary but di↵erent equity compensation, or (4) same equity and salary compensation.
Table A.2 shows that about 22% of the firms in our sample adopts an equality-in-equity strategy
(Same Equity & Di↵erent Salary) regardless of job rank and function. Within a firm that adopts
the equality-in-equity strategy, when a higher ranking job receives higher salary but the same
equity compared to a lower ranking job, the former receives a compensation package that is more
heavily weighted in salary, contrary to the recommendations of the traditional theories we discussed
earlier. Our theory of domain-contingent inequality aversion, however, rationalizes the use of this
equality-in-equity strategy, as is shown in Section 2.
——————–Insert Table A.2——————–
To demonstrate further the empirical inconsistency with traditional theories, we focus on the 227
firms that adopt the equality-in-equity strategy, and examine the relationship between the weight
of equity in a compensation package and the rank of the job by exploring intra-firm variation in
the equity-to-salary ratio (E/S ratio), where
E/S ratio =
Equity in 0.01%
Salary in $1000
.
23For instance, if a firm only lists job postings for an analyst job, a senior job, and a VP job, then the analyst job
will have intra-firm rank 1, the senior job will have intra-firm rank 2, and the VP job will have intra-firm rank 3.
24Each job posting specifies a range for salary in $1000 and a range for equity in %. We use the mean of each range
as the compensation data point for a given job posting. Furthermore, we rescale equity compensation by 100 so that
equity is in 0.01%.
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The E/S ratio reflects job compensation in equity relative to salary in absence of knowledge of firm
value. Within the same firm, a job with higher E/S ratio has a compensation package that is more
heavily weighted in equity, vice versa.25 Using firm fixed e↵ects regressions, we examine the rela-
tionship between E/S ratio and job ranks or functions, controlling for firm-specific unobservables.
The main specification is:
E/S Ratioij =  0 +Rank
0
ij 1 + Function
0
ij 2 + fi + uij
where E/S Ratioij is the equity-to-salary ratio for job j of firm i, Rankij is the vector of the job
rank dummies for job j of firm i, Functionij is the vector of the job function dummies for job j of
firm i, and fi are the firm fixed e↵ects.  1 and  2 are vectors of coe cients. Table A.3 lists the
alternative theories and the corresponding predictions for the signs of elements in  1. The liquidity
constraint, retention, and performance incentive motivations imply that, within a firm, as the rank
of a job increases, the job should be compensated with a greater weight in equity and hence a higher
E/S ratio, implying that  1 > 0. On the other hand, the domain-contingent inequality aversion
theory says that workers are more inequality-averse in the equity domain than in the salary domain
and firms take such preferences into consideration. As we show in Section 2, this theory suggests
that a firm would adopt an equality-in-equity strategy. Therefore, while the firm may o↵er more
salary as the job rank moves up, it would give the same equity to all employees, producing a lower
25We are interested in how equity compensation is used as a percentage of total compensation, i.e., the weight
of equity in total compensation that consists of both equity and salary. However, there is considerable uncertainty
regarding the monetary value of equity for a given firm. Fortunately, we do not need to observe this value to identify
the relevant variation in compensation structure. Specifically, we claim that variation in equity-to-salary (E/S) ratio
would reflect variation in equity as a percentage of total compensation, at least direction-wise. The claim is supported
by the following: Let a compensation package be characterized by (x, y) where x > 0 is the salary in dollars and
y > 0 is the equity in percentage. Note that the form of the equity compensation is in stock options, so the value
would be dependent on expected future growth of the firm. Let V˜ be the unknown value of equity compensation per
percentage. Note that the perceived V˜ should be positive, otherwise there would be no reason for providing equity.
Consider another compensation package characterized by (x0, y0) where x0 > 0 and y0 > 0. Then we have
y
x
>
y0
x0
, yx0 > y0x
, yx0 + yy0V˜ > y0x+ yy0V˜
, y(x0 + y0V˜ ) > y0(x+ yV˜ )
, y
x+ yV˜
>
y0
x0 + y0V˜
Therefore, we may use equity-to-salary ratio to characterize the structure given a compensation package for a job
since a high ratio suggests that equity has a larger weight in the package.
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E/S ratio as rank increases and suggesting that  1 < 0.
——————–Insert Table A.3——————–
Table A.4 provides results for the firm fixed e↵ects regression using the firms adopting the
equality-in-equity strategy are presented in Column (1) is the main specification. The reference
group is the group of engineer roles in analyst rank. The estimated coe cients on the Senior, Lead,
Manager, VP, and Chief rank dummies are negative and statistically significant, suggesting that
most elements in  1 are negative. The estimates on the rest of the rank dummies are statistically
insignificant. The evidence for  1 < 0 is stronger when we replace the job rank dummies in Column
(1) by the intra-firm job rank dummies in the Column (3) specification. The intra-firm job rank
dummies are defined such that the lowest rank within a firm is always labeled as Rank 1, the second
lowest rank is labeled as Rank 2, and so on. Since the firm having the most ranks among listed
jobs recruits across seven job ranks, Rank 7 is the highest possible intra-firm rank. We find that all
estimates on the intra-firm rank dummies are negative and statistically significant at the 5% level
(and mostly significant at the 1% level), supporting the hypothesis that  1 < 0. Higher ranking
jobs have lower E/S ratio than the lowest rank jobs. Results remain unchanged when additional
location dummies are included in Columns (2) and (4). Across all specifications, we control for job
function and find positive coe cients for the business and designer dummies at the 1% significance
level, implying that business and designer roles have higher E/S ratios than engineer roles.
——————–Insert Table A.4——————–
Our results assume that the posted compensation package ranges reflect the actual compensation
package o↵ered after hiring. Brencˇicˇ (2012) shows that employers are less likely to post a wage
o↵er when searching for skilled workers. Search theory typically assumes that wage o↵ers would
be contractually binding, and when posted wages are negotiable, negotiation is often assumed
to happen within the posted ranges (Brencˇicˇ, 2012). However, data on the potential di↵erences
between posted wage o↵ers and subsequent starting wages are limited.
In summary, for the firms adopting the equality-in-equity strategy in our sample, we find evi-
dence for  1 < 0, suggesting that the lowest ranking jobs have compensation packages more heavily
weighted in equity as reflected by higher E/S ratios. Therefore, existing traditional theories that
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predict a positive relationship between job rank and equity weight are insu cient for explaining the
behavior of firms that distribute equal shares of equity. Moreover, since these firms o↵er workers the
same equity, high-ranking jobs compensated with smaller weights in equity necessarily receive more
salary. Our proposed behavioral theory suggests a new channel for consideration. In Section 2, we
find a negative asymmetric e↵ect of inequality in equity and mixed e↵ects of inequality in salary
when workers are more inequality averse in the equity domain than in the salary domain. The
implication is that firms would want to adopt the equality-in-equity strategy by granting employees
the same equity regardless of job rank while allowing for more variance in salary. Consequently,
low-ranking jobs receive compensation packages more heavily weighted in equity.
Table A.1: Job Posting Frequency by Job Function and Rank. Job ranks are listed in
ascending order. Analyst is the lowest rank. Chief is the highest rank. Source: Author’s catego-
rization using job posting data from AngelList.
Job Function Number of Observations Job Rank Number of Observations
Engineer 2,175 Analyst 2,195
Business 2,096 Junior 176
Data 199 Senior 767
Designer 274 Lead 318
Total 4,744 Manager 792
Director 274
VP 112
Head 90
Chief 20
Total 4,744
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Table A.2: Number of Firms by Compensation Strategy. Source: Author’s categorization
using job posting data from AngelList.
Compensation Strategy Number of Firms Percent
Di↵erent Equity & Salary 717 69.34
Same Equity & Di↵erent Salary 227 21.95
Same Salary & Di↵erent Equity 23 2.22
Same Salary & Equity 67 6.48
Total 1,034 100
Table A.3: Predictions on  1 by Competing Theories. This table lists the alternative theories
and the corresponding predictions for the signs of elements in  1.  1 > 0 implies that a job with
higher rank has a higher E/S ratio or, equivalently, is compensated with a greater weight in equity
than in salary.  1 < 0 implies the opposite.
Theory Prediction
Liquidity Constraint Theory  1 > 0
Retention Theory  1 > 0
Performance Incentive Theory  1 > 0
Domain-Contingent Inequality Aversion Theory  1 < 0
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Table A.4: Firm Fixed E↵ects Regression. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level
are reported in parentheses. Equity is reported in 0.01% and salary in $1000. The sample is
job postings by the 227 firms that adopt the equality-in-equity strategy. The reference job rank
(absolute) is analyst. Intra-firm job ranks (relative) are recoded within firms, and the reference
intra-firm job rank is the lowest within-firm job rank. The reference job function is engineer.
Location dummies include Silicon Valley, other CA, New York, Boston, Chicago, and DC; the
coe cients on location dummies are largely statistically insignificant and unreported in this table.
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
E/S Ratio E/S Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Job Rank (Absolute) Job Rank (Relative)
Junior 0.015 0.015 Rank 2 -0.033⇤⇤⇤ -0.033⇤⇤⇤
(0.032) (0.032) (0.011) (0.011)
Senior -0.032⇤⇤ -0.033⇤⇤⇤ Rank 3 -0.043⇤⇤ -0.044⇤⇤
(0.012) (0.013) (0.017) (0.017)
Lead -0.041⇤⇤⇤ -0.042⇤⇤⇤ Rank 4 -0.059⇤⇤⇤ -0.059⇤⇤⇤
(0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016)
Manager -0.036⇤⇤ -0.036⇤⇤ Rank 5 -0.052⇤⇤⇤ -0.051⇤⇤⇤
(0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017)
Director -0.031 -0.030 Rank 6 -0.047⇤⇤⇤ -0.047⇤⇤⇤
(0.022) (0.023) (0.008) (0.008)
VP -0.160⇤⇤ -0.161⇤ Rank 7 -0.049⇤⇤⇤ -0.049⇤⇤⇤
(0.081) (0.082) (0.010) (0.010)
Head -0.006 -0.007
(0.021) (0.021)
Chief -0.237⇤⇤⇤ -0.245⇤⇤⇤
(0.070) (0.065)
Job Function
Business 0.040⇤⇤⇤ 0.040⇤⇤⇤ 0.040⇤⇤⇤ 0.041⇤⇤⇤
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Data -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Designer 0.036⇤⇤⇤ 0.036⇤⇤⇤ 0.040⇤⇤⇤ 0.040⇤⇤⇤
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Constant 0.319⇤⇤⇤ 0.329⇤⇤⇤ 0.317⇤⇤⇤ 0.316⇤⇤⇤
(0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.012)
Firm Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Dummies No Yes No Yes
Observations 1,018 1,018 1,018 1,018
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B Appendix: Additional Propositions
All proofs are relegated to the Supplementary Appendix.
B.1 Proposition B.1
Proposition B.1. e⇤1 is nondecreasing in x1 and is nonincreasing in x2.
Proposition B.1 says that higher salary cannot reduce a worker’s e↵ort, and can only increase it
or have no impact. On the other hand, higher salary of one’s coworker cannot increase one’s e↵ort,
and can only decrease it or have not impact. These patterns are hinged on inequality aversion in
the salary domain.
B.2 Proposition B.2
Proposition B.2. Let  y1 > 0 be the change in y1, e⇤1 is increasing in y1 if
 y1
y1
> ↵x+ x(1  x)(1  y) .
Increasing a worker’s equity may not necessarily increase his e↵ort but is guaranteed to increase
his e↵ort when the equity change is large enough. Proposition B.2 gives a su cient but not
necessary condition. It is possible for a su ciently small increase in equity to decrease e↵ort. Since
↵x+ x
(1  x)(1  y) is increasing in ↵x and  x, the equity change is more likely to be large enough when
the degree of inequality aversion in the salary domain is small.
B.3 Proposition B.3
Proposition B.3. Let  y2 > 0 be the change in y2, then
(a) 9  > 0 such that e⇤1 is decreasing in y2 if  y2 2 ( ,+1);
(b) 9 0 > 0 and  00 > 0 such that e⇤1 is increasing in y2 if y2 < y1 and  y2 2 ( 0,  00).
Proposition B.3(a) states that a raise in the coworker’s equity reduces the worker’s own e↵ort
when the raise is big enough. But according to Proposition B.3(b), a raise in the coworker’s equity
may increase the worker’s e↵ort if the worker is in a position with relatively high equity and the
coworker’s raise is not too big. When a big raise in coworker’s equity exacerbates inequality in
equity, the worker responds unfavorably due to inequality aversion. On the other hand, if the
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equity raise in the coworker’s pay mitigates inequality in equity, the worker may respond favorably
by providing more e↵ort.
B.4 Proposition B.4
Proposition B.4. Let x2 = x0, and let e⇤1 = e01 when x1 = x2. Then,
(a) limx1"x0 |e⇤1   e01|   limx1#x0 |e⇤1   e01|
(i) if y2 > y1; or
(ii) if y2 = y1 and ↵x    x   2↵x x.
(b) limx1"x0 |e⇤1   e01|  limx1#x0 |e⇤1   e01|
(i) if y2 < y1; or
(ii) if y2 = y1 and ↵x    x  2↵x x.
The equalities hold when limx1"x0 e⇤1 = limx1#x0 e⇤1 = e01.
Relative to equality in salary (x1 = x2 = x0), when a worker’s e↵ort responds more to salary
raises (x1 > x0) than to salary cuts (x1 < x0), we say that inequality in salary has a positive
asymmetric e↵ect on e↵ort. If the reverse is true, we say that inequality in salary has a negative
asymmetric e↵ect on e↵ort. The e↵ect is symmetric if a worker’s e↵ort responds to salary cuts
and raises in the same magnitude. Unlike the negative asymmetric e↵ect in the equity domain,
Proposition B.4 suggests that the results on the e↵ect of unequal salary are mixed. According to
Part (i) of Proposition B.4(a), inequality in salary has either a symmetric or negative asymmetric
e↵ect on worker 1’s e↵ort when worker 1 has less equity than worker 2. When worker 1 has more
equity than worker 2, Part (i) of Proposition B.4(b) says that inequality in salary has either a
symmetric or positive asymmetric e↵ect. Part (ii) of Propositions B.4(a) and B.4(b) state that
when workers have the same equity, the relationship between advantageous and disadvantageous
inequality aversion in the salary domain (↵x, x) determines whether there is a positive or negative
asymmetric e↵ect. Finally, if e⇤1 remains unchanged regardless of equity cuts or raises, then it is
trivially true that the e↵ect of inequality in salary is symmetric.
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B.5 Proposition B.5
Proposition B.5. Let x2 = x0, y2 = y0, and let e⇤1 = e01 when x1 = x2 and y1 = y2. Then,
limy1"y0 |e⇤1 e01|
limx1"x0 |e⇤1 e01|
  1, ↵x    x  2↵x x , limy1#y0 |e
⇤
1 e01|
limx1#x0 |e⇤1 e01|
 1.
According to Proposition B.5, relative to general equality (x1 = x2 = x0, y1 = y2 = y0), e↵ort
responds more to equity cuts (y1 < y0) than to salary cuts (x1 < x0) if and only if e↵ort responds
more to salary raises (x1 > x0) than to equity raises (y1 > y0).
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C Appendix: Laboratory Experiment
C.1 Experimental Procedures
Figure C.1 lays out the experimental procedure. Detailed experimental instructions for the control
group and the treatment group are available in the Supplementary Appendix.
Realization of group output
Earnings in points converted to cash payment
Demographic Questions
Group Assignment (2 per Group)
Each member receives a flat 
payment (in points) & a share of 
group output (%)
Make a decision to increase 
probability of group success 
at a personal cost 
Instructions & 
Comprehension Checks
7 Scenarios of group 
production game with different 
compensation schemes
Control Group Treatment Group
Group Assignment (2 per Group)
Each member receives a flat 
payment (in points) & a share of 
group output (in points)
Make a decision to increase 
probability of group success 
at a personal cost 
Instructions & 
Comprehension Checks
7 Scenarios of group 
production game with different 
compensation schemes
Screening
Consent
Figure C.1: Experimental Procedures.
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